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ESSAY: HOW TO HOLD A STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Ann M. Lousin*
Although few states have held constitutional conventions in recent
decades, there is renewed interest in holding state constitutional
conventions in the twenty-first century. This Essay explains the author’s
views on holding such a convention, based on her experience in Illinois
and with a view toward a California convention. The author believes
that the two keys to a successful convention in the twenty-first century
are extensive preparation and transparency. Only with preparation can
the delegates and staff of a convention draft a document worthy of
adoption. Only with great transparency of the process, especially in the
Internet age, can the citizens be confident that the proposed constitution
is truly “theirs.” The author offers ten tips for holding a convention.

It is inevitable that one or more of the fifty American states will
hold a state constitutional convention within the next few decades.
Too many states are facing issues that will require substantial
revisions of their constitutions. These issues include the near
financial collapse of many state and local governments, the inability
of many states to provide an ethical and efficient framework for their
governments’ operation, and the increasing reliance both of local
governments on the state and of the states on the federal government
for revenue and even guidance. 1

* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School (Chicago). University of Chicago,
J.D.; Grinnell College, B.A. Professor Lousin was a research assistant at the Sixth Illinois
Constitutional Convention in 1970 and an assistant to the Speaker of the Illinois House of
Representatives from 1971 to 1975. She staffed the Constitution Implementation Committee from
1971 to 1973 and was Parliamentarian of the House from 1973 to 1975, when she joined the John
Marshall Law School faculty. She has also held several governmental positions since then and
has written and lectured extensively on state constitutional issues. Her book, The Illinois State
Constitution: A Reference Guide, was published in 2009.
1. See Ann M. Lousin, Challenges Facing State Constitutions in the Twenty-First Century,
62 LA. L. REV. 17, 18–20, 25–26 (2001) (discussing trends toward national uniformity and
centralization of state education financing).
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Although I believe that most of the problems mentioned also
require a drastic change in citizens’ attitudes, I realize that the
problems are due to more than just the absence of political will. State
constitutions drafted a century or more ago frequently hinder the
resolution of problems in the twenty-first century. When Illinoisans
voted to hold a constitutional convention in 1968, the state’s extant
constitution was almost a century old. 2 One of the rallying cries of
proponents of holding a “con con” 3 was to change “the century-old
constitution,” to update “the horse-and-buggy constitution.” 4 Like
many post–Civil War state constitutions, the 1870 Illinois
Constitution contained many detailed restrictions on government. 5
As Illinois’s population and complexity increased, many of these
restrictions seemed at best quaint, and at worst barriers to the
development of the state.
One of the salient features of the 1970 Illinois Constitution is the
relative lack of restrictions on government. Indeed, many of those
who wish to amend the Illinois Constitution have wanted to impose
more restrictions, especially upon the taxing and spending powers. I
regard this view as folly. Most citizens want more, not fewer,
services from their governments at all levels. 6 I believe the most
desirable “restrictions” on government are, first, a system of checks
and balances among the branches and offices, and second, as much
transparency as can be maintained without impinging on individuals’
rights of privacy.
Let us assume that a state, such as California, wished to hold a
convention sometime after 2011. The state would first have to follow
the procedures set forth in its current state constitution. 7 To some
extent, each state constitution restricts citizens’ power to modernize
that constitution, rather like the “dead hand” of the testator trying to
determine how his heirs should spend their inheritance. 8
2. See ANN M. LOUSIN, THE ILLINOIS STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 13
(2010).
3. A constitutional convention is commonly referred to as a “con con.”
4. JANET CORNELIUS, A HISTORY OF CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS 118 (1969).
5. See LOUSIN, supra note 2, at 9–13.
6. See Lucy Madison, Do Americans Really Want a Smaller Government?, CBSNEWS.COM
(Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20019244-503544.html.
7. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII.
8. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. XI; GA. CONST. art. X; ILL. CONST. art. XIV; N.J. CONST.
art. IX.
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However, to a remarkable extent, most state constitutions also
seem to leave many issues concerning a convention to the state
legislature. The citizens of the state, through their elected
representatives, can usually decide when the convention is to be held
and how the members of the convention (usually called “delegates”)
are to be elected and compensated. 9 To a great extent, a legislature
can make or break a convention through its power to regulate the
elections, to fund the convention, and to increase or decrease the
chances of the convention’s success. If I were advising a state on
holding a convention, I would first speak with the Governor and the
state legislators. If they see a convention as a “rival body”—a group
of people that could undermine their authority—they may well doom
a convention from the outset. Ever since 1787 when the Congress
organized under the Articles of Confederation called a convention,
legislatures have regarded con cons with skepticism, if not downright
hostility. 10 Sometimes the legislatures try to co-opt a convention and
create a constitution that reflects only the views of the incumbent
legislators.
Very often, the best that one can hope for is a kind of benign
neglect. That is what happened in Illinois from 1968 to 1970. 11 Many
legislators were surprised that the voters chose to call a constitutional
convention in November 1968. Although several legislators who
took office in January 1969 took an active role in drafting the statutes
providing for the election of the delegates and for convention
funding, most thought they had more important things to do. Indeed,
with the state in the midst of one of its periodic economic crises, the
legislative leaders were more interested in passing a state income tax
that would pass muster under the 1870 state constitution than in
shaping the form of a convention that might (or might not) draft a
new state constitution. They passed the statutes, they provided
funding, and then to a great extent, they ignored the convention.
Although incumbent legislators were able to run for slots as
delegates, only two legislators also served as delegates.

9. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 29–30 (2010).
10. See LOUSIN, supra note 2, at 20; Ann M. Lousin, Another Con Con? It’s Our Choice,
CBA REC., June 1988, at 30, 30 (discussing how the legislature is unlikely to submit to a call for
a constitutional convention).
11. For a discussion on Illinois’s history see LOUSIN, supra note 2, at pt. 1.
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Regardless of how a state decides to hold a convention, there are
certain givens that I believe should be common to all con cons in the
twenty-first century. I propose ten of them, rather like a “Letterman’s
Top Ten” list. In this case, however, I shall roll these tips out in the
order in which a state would address these issues, not in the order of
importance. All of them relate to the two keys to a successful
convention: preparation and transparency.
1. The People of the State Must Have Conversations About
What They Want for Their State and Begin Preparing Studies of the
Issues That Truly Relate to the Constitutional Problems
Hindering Their Goals for the State.
This is really a dual suggestion: (1) the people of the state must
begin thinking about what they consider their goals to be, and (2)
those planning a convention must begin preparing serious academic
studies relating to the people’s goals.
First, it is now clear that the general populace, especially the
voters, must have a role in deciding what the state’s goals are. Of
course, some of those goals are contradictory: I want more services,
and I want to pay lower taxes; or I want governments to hire the best
people available, and I want them to hire more members of my
family or racial/ethnic group, irrespective of their formal credentials;
or I want laws enforced against other people, but not against me.
In 1968 it was possible for those campaigning for a convention
to be vague about their goals for Illinois. The 1870 Illinois
Constitution was clearly so restrictive and so outmoded that it was
possible to say that “the great state of Illinois deserves a constitution
fit for the twentieth century.” As best we can glean from the
literature, there were few specific proposals regarding goals. The
constitution later drafted and adopted made some drastic changes in
government: strong civil rights provisions; strengthened
gubernatorial vetoes; a shorter executive ballot; more safeguards for
judicial ethics; the strongest municipal home rule provisions in the
country, a matter of great importance to Chicago and other large
cities; a sophisticated budget and finance process; abolition of one
hated tax, the ad valorem personal property tax, and modernization
of the tax structure; state-wide boards regulating elections and
education; and a modernized process for amending the state
constitution. As I recall, none of these, with the possible exception of
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repealing the ad valorem personal property tax, was mentioned
during the 1968 campaign for a call for a con con.
The same scenario continued during the primary and general
elections for delegates to the convention. I remember that
occasionally the candidates spoke in general terms about
“streamlining government,” or “getting rid of the deadwood in the
constitution,” or “taking judges out of politics,” or even “making
government honest and accountable to the people it is supposed to
serve.” However, few candidates were willing to risk losing votes by
making overly specific proposals. The only possible exception was,
again, repeal of the ad valorem personal property tax, which was
never collected on individuals in the Chicago area, but which
imposed a significant burden on other Illinoisans. Yet, there was
opposition to repeal, chiefly from school officials in rural areas, who
asked where they would find the revenue to fund schools.
If California—or any other state—were to hold a convention in
the near future, such vague statements would never pass muster.
Voters want to know, with relative specificity, what candidates stand
for and, in the case of a convention, what the purpose of calling the
convention would be. This requires finding a consensus among the
public about the state’s goals. It also requires determining a
consensus about what is and is not a constitutional problem. I call
this a “state-wide conversation.”
Second, the people of the state must conduct serious studies of
their problems and decide whether their problems relate to their
constitution. While it is not my place to tell Californians what their
constitutional problems are, I have visited California approximately
every two years since my first visit in 1950 as a small child. I have
watched the population of this incredibly rich and diverse state
explode. I have seen California, one of the largest states in terms of
square miles, 12 become the most populated state in the union. 13 The
resources of California, both in its land and its people, make it the

12. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES SUMMARY: 2000
CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING 18 tbl.11 (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/cen2000/phc3-us-pt1.pdf.
13. Id. at 29 tbl.17.
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eighth-largest economy in the world. 14 All by itself, California has a
larger economy than the Russian Federation. 15
May I suggest that the California Constitution contains
provisions that were well suited for an expanding California, but that
are not as appropriate for a mature economy with a stabilized
population? Article IV, section 12(d), as I read it, requires that twothirds of the members serving in each house of the California
legislature approve the state budget. 16 This requirement has been in
place since 1933. 17
When I first heard of this requirement, I recognized it was one
suited for a budget that must establish the infrastructure for an
expanding state. From the end of World War II until the end of the
twentieth century, California’s population increased on average by
approximately 28 percent every decade.
Year
1930 18
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010

California Population
5,677,251
6,907,387
10,586,223
15,717,204
19,971,069
23,667,764
29,760,021
33,871,648
37,253,956

Percentage Increase
-21.668%
53.259%
48.468%
27.065%
18.510%
25.741%
13.816%
9.9857%

I was a witness to this expansion as I traveled across the state
from 1950 to 1990 and saw deserts become suburbs on a yearly
14. California Economy Ranking Among World Economies, ECONPOST (Nov. 8, 2009),
http://econpost.com/californiaeconomy/california-economy-ranking-among-world-economies.
15. Id.
16. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12(d).
17. See Joe Mathews, The Rule That Wrecked a State, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2010, at A40;
see Special Report: Democracy in California, ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 2011, available at
http://www.economist.com/surveys/downloadSurveyPDF.cfm?id=18567784&surveyCode=%254
e%2541&submit=View+PDF.
18. For data on California’s population in the years 1930–1990, see U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING 26 tbl.16
(1990), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen1990/cph2/cph-2-1-1.pdf. For data on
California’s population in 2000 and 2010, see PAUL MACKUN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000 to 2010, at 2 (2011).
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basis. Such expansion requires an enormous investment in
infrastructure, especially in schools and public safety. From my
experience with the Illinois legislature, I realized that a two-thirds
requirement also meant that one-third plus one person in any of the
two chambers could thwart the will of the rest of the legislature.
Those who blocked passage of the budget would be in a unique
position to demand concessions, that is to say, projects for their
districts. In Illinois, we would say that they would play “come to
Mama.” The legislative leaders would have to give the bloc that was
obstructing passage of the budget whatever it wanted in order to
secure passage of the budget. Although I have never observed the
California legislature in action, some Californians have told me that
this scenario is substantially correct.
The question confronting Californians is whether the
requirement of an extraordinary majority to pass the state budget
seriously impedes the budget process of a state with a large, but no
longer dramatically expanding, economy. One may argue that the
requirement would take a broad consensus on expenditures by the
legislative branch. One may also argue, as I have intimated, that the
requirement gives a small bloc the power to leverage its votes to
increase local expenditures—what might be called earmarks or
“pork.”
In assessing the role of the extraordinary-majority requirement,
Californians would benefit from studies conducted by the many
excellent university centers around the state. To avoid leaving some
out inadvertently, I shall not try to name them. From 1968 to 1970,
Illinoisans were fortunate in having centers, especially the Institute
of Government and Public Affairs of the University of Illinois, to
prepare studies during the decade preceding the convention,
including specific studies dedicated to the two years preceding the
convention. 19 It would be an understatement to say that these studies
were invaluable; truly, the convention could not have functioned at
all without the preparatory work by these scholars.

19. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ILL., CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDY
GUIDE: DOES ILLINOIS NEED A NEW CONSTITUTION? 4 (2008), available at
http://www.lwvil.org/ConCon_%20StudyGuide.pdf.
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2. The People Must Hold Hearings Throughout the State and
Involve As Many Constituencies As They Can;
It Is Important That Every Group Be Able to Express
Its Views, Even Ventilate Its Anger.
This tip is really a corollary to the first one. In the twenty-first
century, many of us communicate via the Internet. The media,
whether the newspapers or the broadcast media, still play a role, too.
I fully realize that the state-wide conversation mentioned in the first
tip will take place through computers and the media, especially
among young people.
There is no substitute, however, for face-to-face meetings.
Public officials, including the President, have found that their town
hall meetings enable them to hear from many different people,
notably from those who do not call in to talk shows or comment on
blogs. 20 While it takes courage to stand up in a public forum and tell
off a public official, there are those who prefer speaking face-to-face
to writing to an official.
Equally important, public officials find that going into
communities they do not know and speaking to the residents can be
an enlightening, if somewhat disconcerting, experience. Some public
officials have told me that they never realized the extent of
poverty—and the sense of hopelessness that accompanies poverty—
until they drove into neighborhoods and saw block after block of
boarded-up storefronts, of cracked sidewalks covered with glass
shards, and of streets scarred with potholes. When they began to talk
with the residents, they heard voices of anger and frustration. From
those voices came a greater understanding of those residents.
When the Illinois Constitutional Convention began in December
1969, the delegates decided to hold open-mike hearings around the
state. 21 Some reporters derided this as “the road show.” 22 Yet, ever
since then, delegates have said that the experience of traveling to
parts of the state they had not seen and listening to their fellow
Illinoisans, whose accents they had not heard before, enabled the

20. See Peter Nicholas, Obama Speaks with Young Voters, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2010, at
A10.
21. Samuel W. Witwer, Federalism and Constitutions: The Illinois Experience, 63 NAT’L
CIVIC REV. 16, 20 (1974).
22. Id.

Winter 2011]

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

611

delegates to see Illinois as one state. 23 Downstaters, who often think
of Chicago and its metropolitan area as just the corrupt big city that
siphons money from Downstate, were amazed to ride the buses and
trains in the city and to talk with long-time residents of the ethnic
neighborhoods. The biggest eye-opener of all came when visiting the
poorest African American neighborhoods. Chicagoans, who are even
more parochial, were equally surprised by their visits to small towns
and rural areas. The distances that a family had to cover to shop and
that the children had to cover to attend school showed them why
their fellow Illinoisans south of Interstate 80 greatly valued
highways. As many delegates have told me over the years, “that was
when we became Illinoisans.”
Few states are more diverse than Illinois, but California is one of
them. No one race is in the majority. 24 Anyone seeking to form a
consensus as to the goals of Californians and the constitutional
problems that may prevent achievement of those goals would have to
meet with and listen to as many Californians as possible.
3. After the People Decide Which Issues Are Truly Constitutional
Ones, They Must Begin Establishing a Consensus Among the
Major Political Players and Civic Groups Regarding
Which Issues They Want Addressed and, in a General Way,
Regarding Possible Solutions to the Constitutional Issues.
In any constitutional revision process, the major political parties
and civic leaders play a leading role. Occasionally, I hear someone
say that “the people” must take a convention away from the political
leaders and ignore them. This is nonsense. It is the political parties
that are best suited to turn out the vote for a call for a convention, for
the election of delegates, and for the ratification of the proposed
constitution.
Inevitably, there would be civic groups favoring and opposing a
constitutional convention and favoring and opposing the
consideration of specific issues at a California convention. There
would be groups wanting to repeal Proposition 13 and groups

23. See LOUSIN, supra note 2, at 22.
24. California Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
06000.html (last updated Nov. 4, 2010) (showing that there is no racial majority in California
when “White persons” and “persons of Hispanic or Latino origin” are categorically separated).
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wanting to expand it. There could even be civic groups based on
ethnic and racial concerns.
To me, one of the chief constitutional issues that the major
players and groups would have to address in California is whether to
keep, abolish, or amend the initiative and referendum process. Either
the legislature or the voters can initiate the process. 25 As a result,
there are sometimes a dozen or more propositions on the ballot. 26
More significantly, it is common for dozens of petitions for
initiatives to be circulating at any one time. I saw this in action in the
late 1980s in Palm Springs. I was in a shopping center when several
young people at a table asked if I was a registered voter. I said I was,
but not in California, and turned to the young people at the next
table. They were asking registered California voters to sign a petition
for legislation on a hot button issue, I think gun control. Then I
walked down the mall and saw another pair of tables. Some other
young people were registering voters and asking for signatures on a
petition on the opposite side of the hot button issue. It was clear that
political operatives had hired the signature gatherers on both sides of
the issue to acquire signatures for use by political candidates.
Probably, the signature gatherers did not care if the proposition ever
reached the ballot; they had already achieved their goal of obtaining
a targeted mailing list, which is golden in political campaigns.
A few years ago, I told a California legislator that the California
legislature was “tricameral,” not bicameral, because the voters
formed a third chamber. The voters can, in fact, bypass the
legislature through the initiative and referendum process. I asked him
if it was true, as I suspected it was, that the legislators sometimes
punted controversial issues to the voters. He ruefully admitted it was
true. He said that no legislator wanted to vote in favor of raising
taxes to support new programs and that sometimes legislators told
lobbying groups that if they wanted a program they should get
signatures on petitions to put that program on the ballot. No
legislature has the ability to shift responsibility for decisions about
legislation to the voters as much as the California legislature has.

25. CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8, 9 (providing the initiative and referendum process
respectively).
26. See, e.g., CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES 10–13, available
at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/init_history.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
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Clearly, any discussion of the principal constitutional issues
facing California would include the initiative and referendum
system. To a lesser extent, it would also include the recall of elected
officials. Californians have told me it is common to have recall
petitions circulated at cocktail parties, again with little thought of
actually placing the recall issue on the ballot. The petitions are
simply a way of obtaining the signatures of those who might support
a future opponent of the incumbent whose recall is being sought. I
think of this as an “enemies list,” one that President Nixon would
have envied.
The issues I have just identified—initiatives, referenda, and
recall—are truly constitutional issues. Before a convention begins,
the major political players and civic leaders in California would have
to decide whether they wanted the convention to address these issues
and, at least in a general way, how they wanted the convention to
change these time-honored processes.
4. From the Very Beginning, the Process Must Be Open; the
Participants Must Flood the Airwaves and the Internet with
Serious Information Every Day So That the Public Does Not Feel
It Is Being Left out or Kept in the Dark.
In the twenty-first century, it is common for many citizens to
obtain information and form views about public issues via the
broadcast media and the Internet. Those planning a convention must
have a public relations, public information, or press department that
meets with all aspects of the media every day and keeps the public
informed.
In 1787, it was possible for the federal constitutional convention
to meet in secret and forbid delegates to take notes or keep minutes.
Since then, state constitutional conventions have been much more
open. 27
From the time that the Illinois General Assembly passed the
resolution placing a call for a convention on the ballot in November
1968, those seeking to hold a convention regularly communicated
with the public. They organized a public relations campaign as part
of their political campaign to persuade voters to adopt the call for a
27. See, e.g., LOUSIN, supra note 2, at 22; Janet Cornelius, Illinois Constitution-Making in
the Spirit of the Sixties, 1969–1970, 9:1 ILL. HIST. TCHR. 44, 44 (2002), available at
http://www.lib.niu.edu/2002/iht910244.html.

614

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:603

convention. Neglecting to utilize a public relations counter-campaign
was one of the shortcomings of those who opposed holding a
convention.
Communicating the various views about a convention is part of
the state-wide conversation mentioned in the first tip in this Essay. If
the public feels left out of the process, any product of the convention
is probably doomed from the outset.
5. From Early on, There Must Be Serious Academic Studies of the
Situation the State Is in and the Possible Solutions to Its Problems.
A Con Con Is an Academic Seminar;
It Is Serious Business, and Very Costly.
As mentioned in the first tip, it is imperative that there be
serious academic studies of the issues facing a convention before the
convention begins. The academic centers at universities must take
the lead. If they do not, the lobbying groups representing specific
interests will provide their own “studies” of state problems.
Predictably, the solutions the lobbyists offer will be skewed toward
their positions.
Although the convention will have its own research staff, that
staff will simply have neither the time nor the resources to conduct
exhaustive research on a state’s problems or possible solutions.
There are now excellent comparative studies of the fifty states and
how those states have attempted to solve constitutional issues. Some
form of a constitutional study commission must organize and
assemble this research before the delegates are seated.
When the delegates take their seats and begin their deliberations,
there will be time for little else but consideration of proposals and
compromises. Although the staff will be able to conduct some
research, most of that research will be what I call “spot research” or
“day research”—that is, research that must be completed in one day.
There will be no time for thoughtful studies.
During the run-up to the 2008 campaign concerning a call for a
constitutional convention, one young Illinois lawyer told me that he
wanted to hold a convention “so that all the people can gather in
Springfield and hold a debate about the future of the state.” I told
him that a convention would probably cost $80 million and that it
was not an academic seminar, that if he wanted an academic seminar
he should find a foundation that would sponsor such a seminar and
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find Illinoisans willing to spend time debating with each other. I
asked him what would happen if his “great debate” produced a bad
product—defined as something he did not want. He hesitated, and
then said that if it were a bad product, the voters in their wisdom
would vote it down. Clearly, he did not understand the seriousness of
a convention process.
Over the past few decades, many state constitutional
conventions have taken place. Few of them have produced draft
constitutions acceptable to the voters. 28 Although there can be many
reasons why the voters have rejected the drafts, one seems to be that
the delegates simply “debated” instead of preparing for a convention
and hammering out proposals during the convention. A convention is
a serious and expensive business. The overwhelming majority of the
preparation must occur before the convention begins.
6. The Convention Must Operate Independently from Other
Parts of the Government, Especially the Legislature.
It Must Have Its Own Staff, Public Relations Department, and
Administrative Structure.
As mentioned before, legislatures often think of constitutional
conventions as rival legislative bodies. Because legislatures have
extensive staffs and often have the best research departments in state
government, they may want to assign their staffs to the convention.
This is an absolutely terrible idea.
In an era where state governments are trying to save money, it
will be tempting for a convention simply to take legislative staffers
on a “seconded” basis. The legislative staff would be temporary
employees of the convention and return to their regular jobs after the
convention adjourned. This might save some money. Moreover, the
staffers already have expertise. However, the staffers will always
remember that their primary employer is the legislature. This could
be fatal to the independence of the convention.
During the Illinois Constitutional Convention, the staffers were
separate from the legislature. Because the legislature was not in
session during most of the convention, several of its secretaries were
seconded to the convention. One or two members of the nonpartisan
research unit of the legislature also took leave to work for the
28. See generally Lousin, supra note 1, at 26–27 (discussing the need for flexibility in
drafting state constitutions, which would impliedly lead to voter approval).
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convention. However, all of the committee counsel and over 90
percent of the staff were not regular legislative employees.
The public relations department of the convention was also
separate from the state government. Some members of its staff were
former members of the press corps, while one or two were newly
minted journalism graduates. They were excited about being
members of a once-a-century event—a con con—and represented the
convention enthusiastically to the press. In those days, of course,
there was no Internet. In the twenty-first century, a public relations
department would have to establish an Internet framework, as well as
communications with the print and electronic media outlets.
7. The Convention Must Have a Set Starting Date and a Budget
That Contemplates the Ending of the Convention
Within a Year in Order to Encourage the Delegates to
Finish Their Work Expeditiously.
The statutes establishing the framework for the convention must
set the times for delegate elections and when the convention must
begin. In all probability, the Governor will open the convention and
administer the oath of office to the delegates.
It is equally important that the convention’s funding be
adequate, but only for no more than one year. That will encourage
the delegates to finish their work within several months. The saga of
the two most recent Illinois con cons is illustrative. 29 The Fifth
Illinois Constitutional Convention opened in 1920 to much promise.
Most observers realized that the fifty-year-old constitution was
already out of date. However, the Republicans, who commanded a
clear majority at the convention, never seized the opportunity to draft
a constitution within six months. Instead, the delegates of both
parties frequently recessed the proceedings and were at best dilatory
when they did return to business. After two years, the public and
both political parties had lost interest in the endeavor, and the draft
constitution that was eventually submitted went down in ignominious
defeat.
The delegates to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention
were aware of that disaster. The convention opened on December 8,
1969. For most delegates, who were paid on a per diem basis when
29. For a discussion of Illinois’s history see LOUSIN, supra note 2, at pt. 1.
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they attended sessions, the money ran out by the end of the summer.
By August 1, 1970, although most of the clerical staff remained,
most of the committee staffs had returned to other jobs or to graduate
school. Aware that some delegates might stop attending if the
convention dragged on beyond the point of endurance, the delegates
convened virtually every day toward the end of August. It concluded
its business on September 1, 1970, and the Closing Day Ceremonies
took place to great fanfare and substantial press coverage on
September 3, 1970.
Unfortunately, in the era of a twenty-four-hour news cycle, the
public’s attention span is much shorter. In 1970, nobody read
“yesterday’s newspaper.” Today few watch news more than a few
hours old. A constitutional convention must take that short attention
span into account and wind up its work within a year. If there has
been adequate preparation before the convention, a few months of
proceedings should be perfectly adequate to draft a constitution.
8. The Convention Must Establish Television and
Internet Coverage of All of the Floor Sessions and
As Much of the Other Proceedings As Possible.
Here, again, we see the effect of the Internet and the twentyfour-hour news cycle. We also see the effect of C-SPAN, which has
a devoted, if relatively small, viewer following. 30 Who would have
thought thirty years ago that we could have news on television every
single minute of the year? CNN showed it was possible, and other
networks followed suit. 31 Who would have thought that some people
(and I am one) would spend hours watching congressional speeches,
committee hearings, and even proceedings of the British Parliament?
C-SPAN showed it was possible. Consequently, many Americans
expect to see governmental proceedings on television or, with
increasing frequency, the Internet.
None of this was available, let alone expected, in Illinois forty
years ago. The floor proceedings and committee meetings were open
to the public, but only a few dozen seats were available. However,
30. See General Viewer Information, C-SPAN, http://legacy.cspan.org/about/viewer_info/
index.asp?code=VSTATS (last visited Mar. 2, 2011) (describing that C-SPAN has 28.5 million
viewers per week with regular viewers watching an average of 12 hours per week).
31. See John Kiesewetter, In 20 Years, CNN Has Changed the Way We View the News, CIN.
ENQUIRER, May 28, 2000, at 1G.
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there is now a public-affairs channel for the state called The Illinois
Channel. It is similar to C-SPAN and is available on cable. Although
it does not regularly televise proceedings of the Illinois General
Assembly, it does provide excellent insights into state and local
government. If Illinois ever held another convention, everyone would
expect the proceedings to have “gavel-to-gavel coverage” on the
public-affairs channel.
Of course, the desire to observe the proceedings would probably
not extend to committee meetings. The plethora of such meetings
would make television coverage impractical. It would be enough if
they were, as they usually are, open to the public.
9. The Convention Should Consider Submitting
Several Controversial But Discrete Issues Separately from the
Main Document; These “Separate Submissions” Can Rise or
Fall on Their Own and Deflect Negative Emotions Away from the
Main Body of the Draft Constitution.
In Illinois, as in many states, there is a tradition of carving out
several discrete and controversial issues from voting on the main
body of the document. 32 Some of these issues are so controversial,
and public opinion about them so evenly divided, that placing one
side of the issue into the main body would prove fatal. If these issues
can stand or fall on their own, then whichever way the voters decide,
it will not affect the main document. In those situations it is better to
let the voters decide the issues separately.
Illinois has followed this pattern since 1848. In 1970 there were
four such separate submissions. Two of them concerned emotionally
charged issues: (1) whether the voting age should be lowered from
twenty-one to eighteen and (2) whether Illinois should abolish the
death penalty in its constitution.
There were two other separate submissions, both of which
affected state government more directly. One was whether Illinois
should change its unique system of electing members of the Illinois
House (three members elected from each district with cumulative
voting available) to the usual single-member districts or “first-pastthe-post” system. The majority of the Downstate delegates favored

32. For a discussion of Illinois’s history see LOUSIN, supra note 2, at pt. 1.
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changing to single-member districts, 33 largely because they saw the
old system as favoring Chicago and the Democratic Party.
Chicagoans clearly felt otherwise. In the end, the voters decided to
keep a variation on the old system. 34 In 1980, the voters changed
their minds and decided to vote for an amendment that cut the size of
the Illinois House by one-third and abolished the old system in favor
of single-member districts. 35
The other major structural issue was how to select judges.
Illinois has long elected most of its judges. 36 In 1970, most
Downstaters and virtually all of the African Americans in Illinois
wanted to continue to elect judges. 37 So did many members of
various Chicago ethnic groups. 38 In 1970, the voters decided to keep
on electing most judges as opposed to having the governor appoint
judges from lawyers nominated by merit selection commissions. 39
Both judicial selection and election of the Illinois House were
enormously fractious issues that at various times almost broke up the
convention. Separating the votes on those issues from the vote on the
main document made it possible for voters to ratify the main
document without being distracted by controversies over certain
issues.
What would be the similar hot button issues in California?
Perhaps the initiative and referendum process and the recall system
would be such issues. It is hard for me, a non-Californian, to say.
33. See David Kenney, No Cumulative Voting, ILL. ISSUES, Nov. 1976, at 12, available at
http://www.lib.niu.edu/1976/ii761112.html. Cumulative voting is the process by which a voter
who can cast more than one vote can “cumulate” his votes and cast them for one or more
candidates. In the Illinois system, there were three seats to be filled. Each voter could cast up to
three votes among the candidates, of whom there were usually four in the general election. A
voter could cast one vote each for three candidates, could cast one-and-a-half votes each for two
candidates, or could cast all three votes for one candidate. This last option was called the “bullet
vote” and helped a relatively small but organized minority faction elect one representative to the
Illinois House. Typically, there were two Democrats and one Republican in House districts from
a Democratic stronghold like Chicago; there were also two Republicans and one Democrat in
House districts from Republican strongholds in the suburbs.
34. See LOUSIN, supra note 2, at 29.
35. ILL. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, ILLINOIS’ PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 26
(2008), available at http://www.illinoisbusinessroundtable.com/documents/Con%20Con--IBRT%
20report.pdf.
36. JAMES D. NOWLAN ET AL., ILLINOIS POLITICS: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 145 (2010).
37. See Ann M. Lousin, Will Illinois Hold a Constitutional Convention 15–16 (Sept. 3,
2008) (Working Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1262467.
38. Id. at 15.
39. Id. at 14; see LOUSIN, supra note 2, at 140.
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Certainly, however, there are passions in California over particular
issues, as there are in many states, and it is wise to consider
separating those issues from the complex compromises in the main
document.
10. The Ratifying Referendum Must Be Held Soon After the
Convention Ends Because Long Campaigns Bore Voters and Favor
Both Extremists and Those Who Are Opposed to Any Change.
Most observers think that any ratifying referendum must be held
no earlier than two months and no later than six months after the
convention ends. The precise time depends on the state. It is
necessary to send copies of the proposal to the voters and to mount a
state-wide information campaign before the referendum. Of course, it
is also necessary to allow proponents and opponents time to mount
their campaigns, especially if there are separate submissions.
In any state there is always a faction opposed to any change. In
Illinois, the population in the southern third of the state rarely votes
for any kind of change. In most states, organized labor has not
favored calling constitutional conventions or adopting draft
constitutions. In any given state, there are taxpayers who believe that
any constitutional change will result in bigger government and
higher taxes. The longer a campaign is, the stronger the “nay” voices
become.
It is hard to estimate the best length of time between the
conclusion of the convention and the ratification referendum. Each
state is different. But in an era of instant communication, presumably
no state need wait longer than four months and probably should wait
no longer than three months before holding the ratification
referendum. On this issue, as on so many others, fifty states will have
fifty different solutions.
CONCLUSION
This Essay is an expansion of my remarks delivered via Skype
on September 24, 2010, to the Rebooting California Symposium at
Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I have tried to outline ten points I
consider salient in holding a modern state constitutional convention.
Certainly, each state is different from all others. As the century goes
on, my views on these ten tips may change. I have used my home
state of Illinois as an example because I am most familiar with its
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experience. I have referred to possible issues in California because
that is the state most actively considering holding a convention, and
because it was my audience on September 24, 2010.
The keys to any successful convention are preparation and
transparency. A successful convention takes hard work; it takes good
will; and it takes the ability to compromise to draft a decent
constitution and persuade the voters to adopt it. Is it worth it? That is
like asking whether it is worth it to work toward the best government
for the people of a state.
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